-> Science is a result of the sequential interaction between orderly/ organized/ structured forms of science, and periodic chaos (breakdowns of order)
Revolutionary periods (of scientific change) see a breakdown of order and a questioning of the rules of the game, followed by a process of rebuilding that creates fundamentally new kinds of conceptual structures.
Workers in different paradigms (across revolutionary boundaries) are living in different worlds, speaking in different languages.
-> Science has two modes of change, one of which is dramatic and abrupt.
Kuhn’s scientific revolutions generally require crises and the appearance of a new paradigm.
But historically, some revolutions (like molecular revolution in biology, and the appearance of genetics) seem less crisis-induced.
Processes of paradigm-replacement, can’t be described by an explicit philosophical theory of evidence and testing. They should be described as ‘conversions’ phenomena, like a gestalt switch.
-> There are core ways of assessing theories that are common to all paradigms, and which aren’t destabilized by revolutions.
Theories should be:
Predictively accurate
Consistent with well-established theories in neighboring fields
Able to unify disparate phenomena
Fruitful of new ideas and discoveries
Within a paradigm, more precise ways of assessing hypotheses will prevail. These ways are sharper than the general principles, but they stop being explicit principles because they coalesce into the shared mind-set of normal scientists in the field in the form of habits and values. These are the things that are liable to change during a revolution.
Not only are revolutions bound to happen, but they play a positive role in science that makes it so powerful as a means for exploring the world.
For Kuhn, science is a social mechanism that combines two capacities:
The capacity for sustained, cooperative work (-> orderly process)
The capacity to partially break down and reconstitute itself from time to time (-> disorderly process)
-> Revolutions have a non-cumulative nature.
-> Different paradigms in a field are incommensurable with each other.
Incommensurable: Not comparable by use of a common standard or measure.
People in different paradigms will not be able to fully communicate with each other – they will use key terms in different ways a.k.a speaking different languages
Depends on a holistic view about the meaning of scientific language, so each term derives its meaning from its place in the whole theoretical structure
Two people from different paradigms might seem use the same word, but because of their different roles in the two rival theories, their meaning will differ slightly
-> there are few, if any, historical examples of failed communication in crucial debates across rival paradigms.
People in different paradigms will use different standards of evidence and argument. They won’t agree on what a good theory is supposed to do
Paradigms tend to include their own standards for what counts as a good argument or good evidence.
“Paradigms provide scientists not only with a map, but also with some of the directions essential for map-making.”
Thomas Kuhn
Should a scientific theory be required to make causal sense of why things happen? Or can a theory be entirely acceptable if it gives a mathematical formalism that describes phenomena without making causal sense of them? <- This is the kind of principle that will be present in one paradigm but not in another.
Kuhn’s discussion of incommensurability (in regards to scientific standards) is why he’s referred to as a relativist.
Relativism: Relativist views tend to hold that the truth or justification of a claim, or the applicability of a rule or standard, depends on one’s situation or point of view.
General version of claim: “All truth is relative”
Restricted version of claim: “Art/morality/good manners are relative”
The ‘point of view’ in question could be that of an individual, society, or other group. <- THIS IS NOT RELATIVISM
Although current scientific paradigms are not closer than earlier ones to an ‘ideal’ or ‘perfect’ paradigm, they do have more problem-solving power than earlier paradigms did.
-> Do moral rules = rules of reasoning?
Moral rules can have contextuality (sensitivity to circumstances) built into them.
In this case standards = standards governing reasoning, evidence, and the justification of beliefs. And in this case, point of view = users of a scientific paradigm.
-> How can a paradigm have more problem-solving power than previous paradigms while not being any closer to an ideal (because according to Kuhn the ideal paradigm doesn’t/can’t exist)?
A perfect paradigm that contains methodological principles entitled to govern all of science doesn’t exist.
‘Eye of the beholder’ a.k.a. the victor chooses the narrative as progress
* This deflationary view is consistent with relativism
A process of efficiency measured by problem-solving power
Problem-Solving Power: The number and precision of solutions to problems in a scientific field tend to grow over time
but this is incompatible with incommensurability because it paradigms with more problem-solving power are superior to those in the past that had less of it
BUT in terms of comparing scientific forms of investigation to other forms of investigation in the world, Kuhn was not a relativist and had no problem saying that scientific forms of investigation are superior.
Theory-Ladenness of Observation: We can’t think of observation as a neutral source of information for choosing between theories, because what people see is influenced by their paradigm.
This fundamentally challenges empiricism
-> Reality is paradigm-relative/ paradigm-dependent
Changing our view of science requires us to change our metaphysics too – our most basic views about our reality and our relationship to it. a.k.a. there is no single fixed world that science strives to describe -> this flies in the face of a conservative view of conceptual change
The way we see things changes, but the world itself doesn’t change because the world itself doesn’t depend on paradigms
Godfrey-Smith agrees with Position 2, and I think I do too. The world is what it is, and what changes is the way we see it. The way we see the world doesn’t change it… although the way we see the world changes our reality. But the world ≠ reality.
-> Kuhn didn’t believe in the accumulation of knowledge about how the world really works within the large-scale history of science
-> so you don’t see an ongoing growth of knowledge about the structure of the world
This seems to have been influenced by the ‘fall’ of Newtonian physics in the face of theoretical physics -> it caused permanent pessimism about confirmation and the accumulation of knowledge in many scientific philosophers
Kuhn claimed we can only see science as achieving growth in knowledge about the structures of the world if we can see this kind of progress in the parts of science that deal with the most low-level and fundamental entities and processes (a.k.a. physics?)
but chemistry and biology pretty much invalidate this
-> Kuhn’s contribution = describing scientific change
Kuhn’s mechanism: Periodic injections of disorder are just as essential to the process of scientific change as the well-regulated behaviors found in normal science.
Single paradigms rarely dominate a scientific field
Large-scale changes can occur without crises
This history of biology is especially hard to apply Kuhn’s Mechanism to.
Invisible Hand Structure by Adam Smith
Individual selfishness in economic behavior leads to good outcomes for society as a whole. The market is a good distributor of goods even though every man is out for himself.
Selfishness at one level leads to the general benefit of the whole
Punctuated Equilibrium (in biology) by Stephen J. Gould, Niles Eldridge, et al
A lineage of organisms in evolutionary time will usually exhibit long periods of relative stasis/ equilibrium, w/ low-level tinkering but few fundamental structural changes (including homeostatic genetic systems). These long periods are punctuated by rapid change where new fundamental structures arise.
Long periods of stability + resistance to change, punctuated by unpredictable + rapid change to fundamentals